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Faculty and Deans

BRING BACK THE DRAFT?
Neal Devins*
INTRODUCTION

By contrasting the institutional incen~ives of Congress, of the
President, and of the courts on warmaking issues, I will argue that recent
calls to "bring back the draft" 1 should be taken seriously. I will build
my ar~ent around three claims.
'
First, on wannaking issues, courts lack the institutional incentives to
contradict the political process and corresponding cultural norms.
Unless Congress and the White House are at logger heads with each
other (so that the political process cannot resolve an inter-branch
dispute), courts will steer clear of warmaking questions. Courts,
instead, will declare the issue nonjusticiable or validate electedgovernment decisionmaking. Consequently, the question of whether
courts should resolve war powers disputes is-practically speakingsomewhat beside the point. 2 The relevant question, instead, is whether
• Goodrich Professor ofLaw and Professor of Government, College ofWilliam and Mary. This Article
is an elaboration of my comments at "The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs" Symposiwn, held at the
Georgia State University School of Law on January 31,2003. This Article builds upon and makes some use
ofNeal Devins, Abdication by Anothe,. Name: An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L REv. 6S (2000)
and Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CoN. CoMM. 63 (2002).
Thanks to symposium participants and organizers for helpful comments, especially Robert Delahunty, Neil
Kinkopf, Louis Fisher, Jeff Powell, and Eric Segall.
I. The most prominent of these is proposed legislation by CongJCSsman Charles Rangel. See H.R. 163,
1081h Cong. (2003); Charles B. Rangel, Bring Back the Draft, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 31,2002, It A-19; Daryl
Fears, Draft Stirs Debate Over the Military, Rae~? and Equity: Statistics on Minorilies Shares ofService's
Rislo are Disputed, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2003, at A-3. During 2004, mounting casualties in Iraq prompted
Senator Ernest Hollings to introduce legislation to restore the draft. Michael O'Hanlon, Consaiption is the
Wrong Prescription, LA TIMEs, Apr. 28, 2004, at 8 -1S (discussing both Hollings proposal as well as a call
by Senator Chuck Hagel for a national debate on whether the draft should be restored).
2. The book that inspired this symposium, H. JEFFERSON PoWEll, ThE PREsiDENT's At.TJHORITY OvER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN EssAY IN CONSTITl.JTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002), calls for the political-not
legal-resolution of warmaking questions. Powell's book makes ~of legal argument to explain why politics
is the best forum for the resolution of most warmaking issues. Powell's book is excellent and wonh reading.
In arguing that courts will either validate or steer clear of political decision making, I do not mean to question
Powell's use oflegal arguments. My argument, instead, is that the balanc:e ofpowers on wannaking is, ftrst
and foremost, a story about the incentives which animate Congress, the President, and the courts.
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the existing balance of powers between Congress and the President is
sensible.
Second, with virtually no constituent pressure beating against it,
Congress has little incentive to challenge the President on wannaking.
In sharp contrast, Presidents have strong incentives to pursue military
As such, Presidents now dominate war powers
initiatives.
decisionmaking. Needless to say, this arrangement makes sense to those
who believe in presidential control ofwarmaking. However, for those
(like me) who think that no branch of government should dominate
warmaking, the current situation is in need of repair.
Third, serious attention should be paid to reform proposals that make
the American people and, with them, Congress more interested in
presidential warmaking. In particular, constituent pressure is needed to
prod lawmakers to stand up for Congress' institutional prerogatives. On
warmaking, proposals to "bring back the draft" are intended to
accomplish this feat. Though these proposals may not be sound military
policy, the debate over whether such a mechanism is needed to maintain
our system of checks and balances is certainly salutary.

I.

THE COMPETING INCENTIVES OF CONGRESS AND OF THE PRESIDENT

Why is it that Presidents have the tools and incentives to launch
military strikes? Why does the modem Congress seem unwilling to
give teeth to the constitutional mandate that it-not the President"declare war"? More to the point, why does Congress refuse to use its
available tools (appropriations, oversight, and threat of impeachment,
among others) to check presidential warmaking?
To start, '1he rise (and success) of the modern Presidency is the story
of the gradual expansion of executive power, seized or ceded to it often
in times of crisis." 3 Presidential power, in other words, is much more
than the exercise of constitutionally enumerated powers and the power
to persuade. 4 Thanks to the singularity of the office, Presidents are
well-positioned to advance their interests before Congress, the nation,
3. John C. Yoo, 11te First Claim: The Burr Tria( Uniled States v. Nixon, and Pruidentia/ Power, 83
MINN. L. REv. 1435, 1469 (1999).
4. See generally RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PREsiDENTIAL PoWER AND 111E MODERN PREsiD£NCY ( 1960).
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and the world. Critics of the modem day Presidency, including
Theodore Lowi and Jeffrey Tullis, put it this way: "[R]egularly go[ing]
over the heads of Congress to the people at large, the powers of the
American people have been invested in a single office, making [it] the
most powerful office in the world. " 5 Even defenders of presidential
power recognize that Presidents are motivated to seek power and have
the tools to accomplish the task. The opportunities for presidential
imperialism are too numerous to count, according to Terry Moe and
William Howell, because, when presidents feel it is in their political
interests, they can put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both
in gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of their
power. 6
When Presidents act, moreover, it is up to the other branches to
respond. Witness, for example, executive orders: between 1973 and
1998, Presidents issued roughly 1,000 executive orders. Only thirtyseven of these orders were challenged in Congress. More striking, only
three of these challenges resulted in legislation. 7 Presidents thus often
win by default, either because Congress chooses to not respond or
because its response is ineffective. Furthermore, by end-running the
burdensome and ofttimes unsuccessful strategy of seeking legislative
authorization, unilateral presidential action expands the institutional
powers and prerogatives of the Presidency. In other words, the
President's personal interests and the Presidency's institutional interests
are often one and the same.
Presidents, of course, sometimes need Congress to enact legislation.
In pursuing their health care and faith-based initiatives, Presidents Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush had little choice but to turn to Congress.
Here, Congress had the upper hand. Rather than doing battle with the
President on his own field (enacting legislation that is subject to a
presidential veto), Congress forced the President to overcome the
5. JEFFREY K. TuLUS, THE RHETORICAL PREsiDENCY 4 (1987); THEODORE J. LOwt, THE PERSONAL
PREsiDENT: POWER INVEsTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED, at x-xi ( 1985).
6. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power ofUnilateral Action, 15 J. L EcoN. &
0RG. 132, 138 {1999).
7. /d. at 165-66.
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burden of inertia to cajole Congress into action. As such, modem-day
Presidents often advance their agenda through unilateral action, not
legislative strategies. 8
Unlike the Presidency, the individual and institutional interests of
members of Congress are often in conflict with one another. Though
each of Congress' 535 members has some ~take in Congress as an
institution, parochial interests will overwhelm this collective good. In
particular, members of Congress need to be reelected to advance their
(and their constituents') interests. For this reason, lawmakers are
trapped in a prisoners' dilemma: all might benefit if they could
cooperate in defending or advancing Congress' power, but each has a
strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local constituency.9
Nowhere is the gap between legislative and presidential incentives
more stark than war powers. For its part, the modem Congress has very
little incentive to play a leadership role in wannaking. As I will detail in
Part ill, one byproduct of an all-volunteer anny is that lawmakers feel
little constituent or public pressure to reign in presidential warmaking.
Correspondingly, fewer and fewer lawmakers have served in the
military. 10 With little sense of personal connection to or stake in
military matters, lawmakers prefer to focus their efforts on constituent
services and other matters helpful to their efforts to retain their seats. In
addition, the growing cost of running for office means that legislators
have less time to tend to their institutional and constitutional duties.
Presidents, in contrast, often are motivated to seek wannaking power.
Presidents achieve status-fame ifyou will-by leading the nation into
battle. 11 Correspondingly, by launching military strikes, a rally-aroundthe-President phenomenon guarantees a surge of ten percentage points
or more in the president's approval ratings. 12 With military technology
8. See generally RICHARD NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PREsiDENCY (1983). See al.ro NEAL
DEVINS, SHAPINO CONSTinmONAL VAWES: ELECTED GoVERNMENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND rnE

ABORTION DEBATE 97·120 (1996) (amunenting on abortion).
9. See Moe&. Howell, mpra nefe 6, at144.
10. See Alison MitcheU, McCain Enluting Fellow Yeteran.t toBac/cH/3 Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. J1,
1999, at A-24.
II. For an excellent treatment of this question, see William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and
the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNEll. L REv. 695 (1997).
12. This phenomenon h15 been documented by the Gallup News Service. In the wake of the September
11 terrorist attacks and the talk of military action in Afghanistan, the news service posted a study on its Web
site comparing President George W. Bush's surge in approval ratings to the surges experienced by other
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now enabling Presidents to wage war with few casualties, Presidents
have strong incentives to launch such strikes. 13 Also, with Congress
playing a diminishing role in war powers, expectations have developed
about the President's constitutional powers and responsibilities.
Presidents, moreover, fuel these expectations by using the presidential
"bully pulpit" to speak the nation's voice on warmaking.
As these expectations of presidential dominance have become
entrenched, most members of Congress "find it more convenient to
acquiesce and avoid criticism that they have obstructed a necessary
mission."14 Consider, for example, Congress' response to President
Clinton's decision to use military force in Bosnia. Senate majority
leader Bob Dole stated: "[l]n my view the President has the authority
and the power under the Constitution to do what he feels should be done
regardless of what Congress does." 15 Likewise, minority leader George
Mitchell opposed legislation requiring the president to seek
congressional authorization prior to military action in Bosnia because
such "prior restraints ... plainly violate the Constitution." 16 By
suggesting that Congress has no role to play, lawmakers now seem more
interested in protecting the executive branch than their own institution.
More striking, today' s Congress almost always complies with
presidential requests for warmaking authority. In the aftermath of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress has clearly shown that it will
place few limits on presidential warmaking. Outside of purely
constituent-driven issues (whether their states and districts are "getting
enough money for weapons-building factories or their need for more
homeland security money"), 17 lawmakers have largely stood on the
sidelines. For example, when asking Congress for authority to attack
Presidents in times of war. See David W. Moore, Bush Job Approval Reflecu Rally Effect: Close to Highest
Approval Rating Ever Measured, Gallup News Service (Sept 18, 2001), available at,
http://www.gallup.com/poiVreleaseslprO 10918.tsp.
13. Differences in peacekeeping and wannaking are examined in Part m, infra.
14. louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War andSpending Powers, 43 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 931, I006
(1999).

15. 141 Cmg. Rec. Sl7,S29 (dlilyed. Nov. 27, 1995).
16. 139Cong. Rec. 25,483(1993). After President Clinton deployed troops in 1995, the Senate defeated a
"congressional authorization" bill by a vote of77 to 22. 141 Cong. Rec. Sl8,470(dailyed. Dec. 13, 1995).
17. George C. Wilson, Thinking About the Draft, 35 NATL. J. 121 (2003).
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Iraq, President George W. Bush made clear that he could go it alone; the
only reason he sought congressional involvement was to show the
United Nations that he was expressing the views of the American
people. Rather than express outrage at this slighting of their authority,
Democratic leaders largely echoed the President. Senate majority leader
Thomas Daschle spoke of the need for "America to speak with one
voice" and Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Joseph Biden said
that broad presidential authority to act preemptively was necessitated by
the "speed and stealth with which an outlaw state or terrorists could use
weapons of mass destruction." 18
Congress, moreover, has placed little pressure on the Bush
administration's handling of Iraq (at least through April2004). In June
2003, lawmakers refused to launch an investigation into whether the
Bush administration manipulated prewar intelligence on the presence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. 19 In November 2003, Congress
agreed to an $88 billion supplemental appropriation to support the war
effort.20 More striking, mounting casualties in Iraq have not prompted
lawmakers to use their appropriations or oversight powers to
meaningfully cabin Bush administration initiatives.21 While lawmakers
have complained about the "administration's general unwillingness to
share much information at all involving national security issues,"
18. Jim VandeHei and Juliet Eilpcrin, Congress Passes Iraq Resolution; OverwhelmingApprOliDI Gives
Bwh Power to Act Unilaterally, WASH. POST., Oct. II, 2002 a A-1.
19. Helen Dewar and Peter Slevin. GOP Rejects Outside Iraq Probe; Lawmalom: Bwh Prewar Claims
areCongres.J' Purview, CHlCAOOTRIB., June 12, 2003,atA-4. Admittedly, the Republican majority made all
the difference in blocking this initiative. At the same time, Democratic lawmakers have voted with President
Bush m Iraq-related initiatives.
20. Marianne Brun-Rovet and Kim Ghattas, Congres.J Baclcs Iraq Funding, with Condiliom, FINANCIAL
TIMEs, no. 1, 2003, a 8.
21. I do not mean to suggest that Cmgress hao; rubber-stamped all administration proposals. lawmakers,
for example, converted S10 billion out ofa $20 billion fJScal year 2004 appropriation into a loan (instead of an
outright grant) to suppat Iraqi reconstruction. John Crawford, Key Yotes •Highly Partisan, 62 CQ WEEKLY
29·30 (2004). With that said, lawmakers are yet to place meaningful limits on the administration. Budget
proposals, including requests for supplemental appropriations, have been approved. More striking,
congressional oversight hao; not placed significant pressure on the administration. Although lawmakers
sometimes express disapproval of administration policymaldng (especially the administration's failure to
share information with Congress), Congress has not used its oversight powers to meaningfully pressure the
administration to rethink its decisionmaking. For a recent (April and May 2004) sampling of relevant news
stories discussing congressional oversight. see Joseph C. Anselmo & John M. Donnelly, Congress Steps Up
Questioning On Spending Schedule/or Iraq, 62 CQ WEEKLY 973 (2004); John M. Donnelly & Joseph C.
Anselmo, GOP Fact/om Split on Hill Role in Setting the Defeme Agenda, 62 CQ WEEKI.Y I033 (2004);
Bradley Graham & Charles Babington, Probes ojDelainee Deadu Reported, WASH. POST, May 5, 2004, at
A·1; Dan Mcrgan, House Passa $447 Billion Dejeme Bill, WASH. POST, May 21,2004, a A-3.
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Congress has only begun to do little more than ask questions "that
should have been asked all along. "22
A more vivid illustration of Congress' second-class status is the USA
Patriot Act (legislation drafted by the Justice Department that grants law
enforcement agencies additional powers to tap telephones, conduct
searches, monitor the Internet, police financial transactions, and much
more). Making use of a secretive expedited procedure, the House and
Senate overwhelmingly approved the bill-even though many
lawmakers who voted for the Act never had a chance to read it. 23 Civil
liberty interests in Congress disapproved of the legislation but
recognized-as then Senate Judiciary Committee chair Patrick Leahy
put it-"it would be difficult" for Congress to challenge the
administration legislatively.24 Indeed, Leahy thought it next-toimpossible for Congress to take an institutional position at odds with the
White House. Consequently, Leahy spoke of oversight as civil
libertarians' best hope of altering policies "by pressuring the
administration to take a second look at their decisions in the face ofhigh
profile publicity."25 Rather than serve as an independent check on
presidential warmaking, Leahy saw Congress as little more than an
investigative reporter with subpoena power.
II. WHY COURTS Do NOT FILL THE CONGRESSIONAL VOID

With Congress retreating on war powers, courts too have backed
away. Presidential wannaking has become the cultural norm, and
courts, for reasons I will soon detail, are reluctant to act in ways that
frustrate the desires of the political branches and of the American
22. Kirk Victor, Escalating Hostilities, NAT'L J., Oct. 4, 2003 (quoting the Brookings Institution's
Thomas Mann).
23. See Elizabeth A Palmer, Terrorism Bill's Sparse Paper Trail May Cause Legal Vulnerabilities, 59
CQ WEEKLY 2533 (200 I). The fmal version of the statute largely resembled the administration proposal.
Although some important changes were made to the bill (most notably, halfofthe Act's surveillance measures
are set to sunset in 200S),lawmakers who value civil liberties simply found it too "difficult to launch a frontal
challenge to a popular president before the practical results of his policies arc known." Elizabeth A Palmer &
Adriel Bettclheim, WarandCivi/Libertiu: CongreuGropaforaRok, S9CQWEEKLY2820(2001). See
also Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks in August, WASH. POST MAGAZINE, Oct 27, 2002, at 6 (detailing how
White House negotiators dominated civil liberty interests in Congress).
24. Palmer & Bettelhcim, supra ncte 23, at2823.
25. ld
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people. Furthermore, courts are especially reluctant to buck social
norms on war powers. Unlike individual rights issues, where courts
have staked out a leadership claim and, in so doing, expanded their
power, "[a]ny inept decision about war and peace may have dramatic
and readily understood real world consequences that may erode the
[judiciary's] prestige and endanger its public respect."26
Court decisionmaking conforms to cultural norms for two quite
distinct reasons. First, as Chief Justice William Rehnquist reminded
us, the "currents and tides of public opinion ... lap at the courthouse
door,"27 for "judges go home at night and read the newspapers or watch
the evening news on television; they talk to their family and friends
about current events.''28 As such, "[j]udges, so long as they are
relatively normal human beings, can no more escape being influenced
by public opinion in the long run than can people working at other
jobs. "29 Just as the Supreme Court leaves its mark on American society,
so do social forces leave their mark on constitutional law.
Second, as Justice Robert Jackson observed some fifty years ago,
"[t]he practical play of the forces of politics is such that the judicial
power has often delayed but never permanently defeated the persistent
will of a substantial majority."30 Social and political forces, for
example, played a defming role in the Court's reconsideration of
decisions on sterilization and the eugenics movement, state-mandated
flag salutes, the Roe v. Wade trimester standard, the death penalty,
states' rights, and much more.31 Justice Owen Roberts, in explaining
the collapse of the Lochner era, put it this way: "Looking back, it is
difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for
26. John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the .Ex.ecutive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A
Consequence ofRational Choice In the Separation ofPowers, 56 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 293, 306 ( 1993).
In explaining why thejudiciary's acquiescence to presidential wannaking is understandable, I am not arguing
that it is desirable.
27. William H. Rehnqu6t, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 751,768
(1986).
28. /d.
29. /d.; see also Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE LJ. 1290, 1314 (1937)
("[J]udicial decisions are not babies brought by constitutional storks, but are born out of the travail of
economic circumstances.").
30. Robert H. Jackson, Maintaining Our Freedo1ns: The Role ofthe Judiciary, 19 VrrAL SPEECHES OF
TH£0AY759, 761 (1953).
31. See generally Louls FISHER. CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES ( 1989);L0UJS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS,
PoLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSrm.mONAL LAW (3d ed. 2001 ).
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uniform standards throughout the country-for what in effect was a
unified economy."32
The extraordinary importance of cultural norms is on full display in
judicial approaches to war powers disputes. Without the backing of
Congress (or the public), courts have left presidential warmaking
alone-validating it outright or concluding that they lack jurisdiction to
review it. In particular, starting with Vietnam, courts have steered clear
of challenges (typically brought by a coalition of lawmakers) to
unilateral presidential action. For the most part, court rulings speak of
the need for the President and Congress to be in "resolute conflict"33
before judges will decide war powers issues.
Congress' failure to stake out an institutional position prompted
federal courts to toss out on political question grounds lawmaker
challenges to Reagan-era military strikes in Nicaragua and El
Salvador.34 Lawsuits challenging President Reagan's initiatives in
Grenada and in the Persian Gulf were, ultimately, dismissed on
mootness grounds.35 Courts invoked ripeness to block lawmakers'
challenge to the constitutionality of President Bush's ordering offensive
actions against Iraq in 1990. "[U]nless the Congress as a whole, or by a
majority, is heard from," wrote district court judge Harold Greene, ''the
controversy here cannot be deemed ripe.',3 6 In explaining why members
of Congress lacked standing to challenge President Clinton's launching
of air strikes in Yugoslavia, the court noted that Congress would need to
stake out an institutional position for there to be "an actual confrontation
sufficient to confer standing. "37 Likewise, lawmaker efforts to bar
President George W. Bush from attacking Iraq without a formal

32. OWENJ.ROBERTS, THECOURTANDTHEC0NSTI1UTION61 (1951).
33. See, e.g., Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854,860 (D. Mass. 1973).
34. See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-99 (D.D.C. 1982), ajfd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 170 F.2d 202, 204, 210 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
35. See Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C.
1987).
36. Dellwns v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1151 (D.D.C. 1990).
37. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34,43 (D.D.C. 1999), ajfd, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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declaration of war were rejected because there was no "clear, resolute
conflict" between the executive and the legislative branches. 38
These rulings are hardly surprising. Lacking the powers of the purse
and sword, courts see no reason to protect a Congress that is unwilling
to protect itself. As then appellate judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it:
Congress "has formidable weapons at its disposal-the power of the
purse and investigative resources far beyond those available in the Third
Branch .... 'If Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not
our task to do so. "'39 On the other hand, were Congress and the
President to stake out conflicting institutional positions, the political
process would have broken down. Here, judicial resolution would be
appropriate: Congress--not a group of disappointed lawmakers-would
be challenging (and, in this way, transforming) the cultural norm of
presidential wannaking.40
When Congress backs the President, courts tend to validate electedgovernment decisionmaking. Consider, for example, the Court's
acquiescence to the World War II internment ofJapanese Americans (an
executive branch initiative authorized by Congress). In explaining the
Supreme Court's failure to stand up for individual rights in these cases,
Earl Warren stated:
The consequences of the limitations under which the Court must
sometimes operate in this area is that other agencies of government
must bear the primary responsibility for determining whether
specific actions they are taking our consonant with our Constitution.
To put it another way, the fact that the Court rules in a case like
Hirabayashi [or Korematsu] that a given program is constitutional,

38. See Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (lstCir. 2003).
39. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.3d at 211 (quoting Goldwater v Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
40. At the same time, whether courts would conclude that the political process, in fact,~ broken down is
not at all clear. For example, courts perhaps would send the dispute back to the political branches in hope ofa
political settlement Courts sometimes do this in disputes between Congress and the White House over
lawmaker requests for information. See loUIS fiSHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUCTS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE PREsiDENT 194-95 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing United States v. AT&T, SSl F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.
1976)).
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does not necessarily answer the question whether, in a broader
sense, it actually is.41

Because the Court understands that it must act in a way that garners
acceptance from both the American people and their elected
representatives, Court rulings speak as much to the social and political
forces beating against the Court as they do to the Justices' best reading
of the Constitution.

III.

BRING BACK THE DRAFT?

Unless and until the American people pressure Congress to play a
more activist role in war powers, the President is likely to determine
whether, when, and how America wages war. Were lawmakers to
defend their prerogatives, perhaps as a response to public pressure,
courts presumably would adjudicate these disputes and might well rule
for Congress in cases where the President does not comply with
congressional demands. On this point, Vietnam-era litigation is
especially instructive. Before popular opposition to the war, courts
simply concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges to
the constitutionality of the war. During "the final round of litigation,
when popular and congressional opposition to the war was at its peak,'"'2
the courts moderated their position. While affording the president wide
latitude to "wind down" the war, courts now argued that the
authorization issue was justiciable and that the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution could not substitute for a congressional declaration ofwar.43
41. Earl Warren, The Bill ofRight.sandtheMilitary,31N.Y.U. L. RF.v.l81, 193 (1962). 2004Supreme
Court decisions involving the Bush administration's detention of enemy combatants are cut from a different
cloth. Unlike Korematsu (where Congress fonnally embraced the World War D intmlment of Japanese
Americans), Congress did not enact legislation codifYing Bush administration practices. Moreover, whereas
the Iraqi prison abuse scandal has contributed to public disapproval of Bush administration initiatives, the
internment policy was politically popular. Consequently, even if the Supreme Court rcbub:s the Bush
administration, I still stand behind the point made in the text about the Court's rcluctana: to contradict the
American people and their elected representatives. ·
.
42. David Cole, Youngm>wn v. Curtiss-Wright, 99 YALE U. 2063,2083 (reviewing HAROLD HONGJU
KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrrY CONsnnmON: SHARING PoWER AfTER 1HE IRAN-cotn"RA AFFAIR (1990)).
43. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488F.2d 611,614-16(D.C. Cir. 1973);Holtmullv. SchJcsinger,484F2d
1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). For a fuller treatment of this evolution, sec
Michael Ratner and David Cole, 17ze Force ofLow: .JudickllEnforcement ofthe War Po-wers &so/ulion, 11
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The question remains: Is presidential control of wannaking
problematic? From my vantage, the answer is an emphatic yes. First,
no one branch of government should define the meaning of key
constitutional provisions. For reasons that Louis Fisher and I have
detailed in other writings,44 the Constitution is more vibrant and more
stable when all parts of government and the American people engage in
constitutional dialogues with each other. By having a sense of stake
(personal or institutional) in the Constitution, the various branches of
government make the Constitution more relevant and enduring. In
contrast, if one branch of government controls an issue, the Constitution
does not serve as a constraint and, as such, has little independent
mearung.
Second, we cannot expect foreign policy and national security to_ be
well-formulated in the hands of an unchecked executive branch. 45
Throughout our history, no branch has consistently demonstrated its
wisdom on war powers issues. Neither Congress nor the President (nor
the courts) can really assure the nation that it is truly wise on war
powers issues; "[t]he only assurance," as Alexander Bickel observed,
"lies in process, in the duty to explain, justify and persuade, to define
the national interest by evoking it, and thus to act by consent."46
Against this backdrop, calls to "bring back the draft" ought to be
taken seriously. With fewer and fewer members of Congress serving in
the military47 and with no risk that their constituents will be
involuntarily conscripted, the country has good reason-as Senator John
McCain put it-''to worry about a greater estrangement, a greater
distancing between the Congress, traditional protectors of the military,
LOYOLAL.A L. REv. 715,730-35 (1984).
44. In particular, see Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L

REv. 83 (1998).
45. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the President is ill-suited to make war powers decisions. The
President may well have comparative institutional advantages on warmaking issues. See McGinnis, supra
note 26. For this reason, the President perhaps should be first among equals in the constitutional dialogue on
warmaking.

46. Alexander M. Bickel, The Needfor a War-Powers Bill, THE NEW REPUBUC 17, 18 (Jan. 22, 1972);
see auo John Hart Ely, Suppose Congreu Wanted a War Powers Act That WOI'ked, 88 CoLUM. L REv. 1379,
1421 ( 1988) (favorably citing Bickel); Lee H. Hamilton, The Role of Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy, Speech
Delivered to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, at I (Nov. 19, 1998) (arguing that a better
foreign policy is produced by a "creative tension between the President and the Congress").
47. See Wilson, supra note 17 (noting that "only 35[%] ofsenators and 27[%] of representatives in this
Congress have ever served in the military'').
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and the military itself.',4 8 In particular, members of Congress have little
sense of personal stake or connection to the military. By bringing back
the draft, members will have much greater incentive to take a strong
interest in military operations. The draft will touch their children and
their constituents in ways that will "'bring a greater appreciation of the
consequences of the decision to go to war.',49
Consider, for example, the critical role that the draft played in
Vietnam. By 1966, "[c]onscription for the war became a hot issue
throughout society as a whole."50 The draft was perceived as unfair;
specifically, student deferments resulted in an unacceptable class bias.
Indeed, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze thought that "the real strength
of the student protest movement" was the widespread perception that
college students took "enormous risks" because they "had avoided the
dangers that others had taken."51 For this very reason, President Lyndon
Johnson sought to eliminate some student deferments in June 1967.
This initiative, however, prodded even greater opposition to the war.
According to Joseph Califano (then a special assistant to the President):
When a lottery was established and graduate deferments were
discontinued, "[s]uddenly the aftluent middle class found their sons in
harm's way, and all hell broke loose. They began to raise hard
questions about the Vietnam War."52 This public pressure prodded the
Congress to play a more activist role and the President to look for a way
out of Vietnam. Consider, for example, the War Powers Resolution of
1973. By calling for the "collective judgment" of both the Congress and
the President before U.S. troops are sent into combat, lawmakers
responded to public pressure to limit presidential war-making.53
48. Thomas W. Lippman, Socially and Politically, Nation Feels the Absence ofa Draft, WASH. POST,
SepL 8, 1998, a A-13.
49. Rangel, supra note I, at A·l9. This does not mean that the families and friends of those who are
drafted will be the only ones applying pressure on Congress and the President See Richard A. Lau et al., SelfInterest and Civilians' Attitudes toward.J the Vietnam War, 42 PuB. OPIN. Qn.Y 464 (1978) (arguing that
those who are self-interested hold similar views to those who do not have friends or family in the military).

The point, instead, is that all Americans will have a greater sense of inte~ in war powers.
SO. TOM WELLS, THEWAR WITHIN 42 (1990).
S I. /d. at 14S.
S2. Joseph A Califano, Jr., When There i.J No Draft, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1999, It A-23.

S3. Over time, the War Powers Resolution (due both to prior drafting and lawmaker acquiescence) has
bolstered unilateral presidential warmaking. See Fisher, supra n<te 14.
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In 1973, President Richard Nixon abolished the draft in order to quiet
opposition to the war. 54 By relieving "affluent, vocal, voting Americans
ofthe concern that their children will be at risk of going into combat,"55
an all-volunteer army was seen as a way to free the military of public
pressure. This is a byproduct of several factors. First, those who sign
up for an all-volunteer army traditionally support the government,
including its pursuit of military initiatives. 56 Second, without a broadbased draft, university campuses are no long centers ofanti-war activity.
The end result is a less engaged public and, correspondingly, less
lawmaker interest in military operations. Third, with an ever-declining
percentage of veterans in Congress, the military finds itself increasingly
isolated from both American society and its civilian leaders. 57
By bringing back the draft (especially a draft that includes the
affluent), the American people would have a stronger sense of stake in
military operations. This seems more true today than during the
Vietnam era. According to Charles Moskos, "declining birth rates and
smaller families makes the loss of children much more traumatic. " 58
Furthermore, the advent of24-hour news networks ensures unrelenting
news coverage of any military strike. No doubt, Congress and the
President would be affected by this heightened interest. 59 In particular,
public opinion constrains presidential warmaking, and the President
often looks to Congress as a barometer of public opinion.60
54. See Dennis Duggan, Draft Makes War Persona~ NEWSDAY, Jan. I, 2003, at A-2; John B. Judis,
Citizen Soldiers, THE NEW REPUBUC, June 28, 1999, It 8.
55. Califano, supra ncte 52, at A-23.
56. See James Burk. The Military Obligations ofCitizens Since Vietnam, 31 PARAMETERS 48, 53 (200 I)
(noting that "[t]raditionally, those who enlisted for military service believed that they were fulfilling an
obligation of citizenship').
57. See Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn, The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and their Mutual
Misunderstanding, 61 NAT'L INT. 29 (2000); Joseph J. Collins, The Complex Context ofAmerican Military
Culture: A Practitioner's Yiew, 21 WASH. Qn.v. 213 (1998).
58. Charles Moskos, Reviving the Citizen-soldier, 147 Pus. IJIIT. 76 (2002) (noting but, ultimately,
disagreeing with this claim); Charles Moskos, 71rtnlcing Big, BOSTON GLoBE, Feb. 9, 2003,1t D-12.
59. Consider, for example, media coverage of the death ofJohnny ..Mike" Spann, the fll'St U.S. operative
to die in Afghanistan. By showing video of Spann in Afghanistan shortly before his death, and by
interviewing members of his family, among other things, President Bush felt the need to speak of him in his
2002 State of the Union address. See Bob Deans, State ofthe Union Address: 'Our War Against Te"or is
Only Beginning'; Bush Yow.s Victory Will Lift the Economy, ATL. J. & CONST., Jan. 30,2002, It A-I.
60. See RICHARD SOBEL, ThiE IMPACT OF PuBUC OPINION ON U.S. fOREIGN POUCV SINCE VIETNAM
(2001) (concluding that public opinion constrains but does not define foreign policy); id. at 122 (quoting
Secretary of State George Schultz as saying "Congress was my public opinion poll").
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In calling attention to how the draft creates incentives for Congress
and the American people to check presidential warmaking, I do not
mean to suggest that the draft is the only mechanism by which the
public will carefully scrutinize war-related decisionmaking. War-time
casualties would also reinvigorate public interest in military operations.
Consider, for example, Iraq: mounting casualties during the
peacekeeping phase of Iraqi operations prompted the George W. Bush
administration to modify its strategy.61 In particular, the administration
feared that growing public opposition to the war would complicate the
President's bid for reelection. 62 For this very reason, the Bush
administration sought to transfer power to the new Iraqi government on
June 30.63 Likewise, in responding to complaints about the hardships
faced by reservists and their families, the administration (with the strong
support of Congress) backed a fiscal year 2005 appropriations bill that
increases military salaries by 3.5% and doubles the allotment for
hardship duty. 64 For similar reasons, casualty minimalization has
become "an independent operational objective" of military
decisionmaking.65 Aerial precision strikes are therefore preferred to the
deployment of ground troops. 66 Unlike casualty minimalization (which
operates as an ex post check limiting the way presidents fight wars),
"bringing back the draft" creates ex ante incentives for lawmakers and
the American people to question the launching of military strikes. 67
61. See Warren P. Strobel & John Walcott. Bush Admin~tration Examining Way.T to Change Course in
Iraq, KNIGHT-RmDER!fRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, AUG. 29, 2003; Mohammad Bazzi, U.S., Iraq Strik a Deal;
·Power Transfer to Transitional Government Seen by End ofJune, NEWSDAY, Nov. 16, 2003 tt A·3.
62. See Richard W. Stevenson, 'America Will Never Run.' Bush Says oflraq, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003,
at A-23; Dan Balz & Richard Morin, Bush Poll Number& on Iraq at New Low, WASH. PosT, May 25,2004, at
A·l (noting that the President's wartime popularity h!ti dimmed lti a result of the prison abuse scandal and
increasing casualties).
63. Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Pre&itkntial Politia and Self-Rule for Iraq~. N.Y. 'nMEs, Feb. 19,2004, at
A-ll.
64. Morgan. supra note 21; see also Joseph C. Anselmo, Pentagon Plansfor Bigger, Betll!r Army With
'Spike, ' 62 C.Q. WEEKI.Y S, 210 (2004).
65. Jeffrey Record, Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War, 32
PARAMETERS 423,423 (2002). With an all-volunteer army, Presidents no longer "have a ready supply of
manpower" and cannot afford the significant loss of life. Doug Bandow, Mend, Never End, the All-Volunteer
Force, 44 ORBIS 463 (2000).
66. Notably, America's all-volunteer army is too small to sustain a war as large as Vietnam.
Consequently, presidents are constrained in how they can fight ground wars. See Richard Halloran, PentagOfl
talres Renewed Pride in Its Personnel, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16, 1985, It A·l.
67. Ironically, because the draft makes the President more accountable to the American people and the
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CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether "bringing back the draft" is sound public
policy,68 Congress has virtually no chance of embracing this initiative.
Lawmakers have no incentive to enact a politically unpopular measure
designed to put pressure on Congress to play a leadership role in warrelated decisionmaking. 69 Nevertheless, for reasons detailed in this
essay, it is important to search for a mechanism through which Congress
and the American people will be meaningfully engaged in the decision
to commit the nation's blood. Let me close by paraphrasing Learned
Hand: Our system of checks and balances, like liberty, "lies in the hearts
and minds of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no
·
law, no court can save it."70

Congress, some military analysts think that the draft's renewal might "increase the public's willingness to
accept wartime casualties." Moskos, supra ntte 58, at84.
68. Congressman Rangel's proposal to bring back the draft, for example, may be a smokescreen to pursue
partisan political objectives. Compare Editorial, Draft Dodge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A-18 (arguing
that Rangel's proposal has "nothing to do with improving the effectiveness ofour military and everything to
do with the politics of class and race"), with E.J. Dionne, Rangel's ChaOenge, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,2003, at
A-27 (arguing that "[i]t is neither race-baiting nor class warfare to suggest that a democratic society has a
problem when members of its most privileged classes are not among the first to rally to the colors at a time of
trouble" and that Congressman Rangel "deserves our gratitude" for his proposal).
69. A January 2003 New.tweek poll, for example, found that only 14% of Americans favored reinstating
the draft. Paul Glasbis, First Draft: The Battle to Create Universal National Service that htU Jwt SI/JTted,
WASH. MoNTHLY, Mar. 1, 2003, It II (discussing the Newsweek poll). Forty-five percent said they would
refuse to consider the idea, and thirty-eight pen:ent were willing to consider reinstating the draft. ld
10. Learned Hand, The Spirit ofLiberty, in THE SPIRIT OF IJBERTY 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed.
1960).

